My ÿeld is mathematical logic, with a special interest in constructivism, and I would not dare to call myself a computer scientist. But some computer scientists regard my work as a contribution to their ÿeld; and in this text I shall try to explain how this is possible, by taking a look at the history of ideas.
became known under the somewhat misleading name of intuitionism, generated a lot of interest, gave rise to a heated debate, but attracted few actual followers. But even those who did not agree with Brouwer's ideas, such as Hilbert, were in uenced by them and by the debate generated by Brouwer's views. Ideas developed in the context of intuitionism turned out to have a relevance which transcends the original setting.
Brouwer's ideas on the foundations of mathematics were embedded in a highly personal and rather extreme version of idealistic philosophy, but it would carry us too far to go into this here. The ÿrst exposition of these ideas on the foundations of mathematics is found in his thesis from 1907 ("On the Foundations of Mathematics").
Brie y, Brouwer viewed mathematics as the activity of building constructions in the mind (of an ideal mathematician); mathematics is about such mental constructions, not about objects in some outside reality. For Brouwer, there is no platonistic universe of abstract ideas existing somewhere quite independently of human cognition.
In his thesis, Brouwer had not yet realized the e ect of his views on logic; but in a paper which appeared a year later, in 1908 ("On the unreliability of the logical principles") he did see the consequences. He demonstrated that from an intuitionistic point of view, we cannot assume that a mathematical statement is either true or false, independent of human knowledge; we can assert "A or not A" only in case we either have a proof of A or an argument showing that any attempt at constructing a proof of A must fail.
As a result, if A represents an open mathematical problem, such as Riemann's hypothesis, we cannot assert, intuitionistically, that A or not A, since we do not know how either to prove A or to refute A. Hence, the so-called "principle of the excluded middle"
A ∨ ¬A
is not an intuitionistic universal logical law. (This does not mean to say that A ∨ ¬A in our example is false, since that would mean we could derive a contradiction from A ∨ ¬A, not just that we are not able to prove it.) Implicit in these considerations is another interpretation of logic. In the usual classical logic, the meaning of a logical operator c combining statements A 1 ; A 2 ; : : : ; A n into c(A 1 ; A 2 ; : : : ; A n ) is explained by describing how the truth or falsity of c(A 1 ; A 2 ; : : : ; A n ) depends on the truth or falsity of each of the components A 1 , A 2 , : : :, A n .
Intuitionistically, the meaning of c is described by explaining what is to be regarded as a proof of c(A 1 ; A 2 ; : : : ; A n ), assuming one knows what counts as a proof of each of A 1 , A 2 ,: : :, A n .
This was made explicit, ÿrst by Heyting (1898 Heyting ( -1966 in 1930 [22] , and more fully in 1934 [23] , and independently by Kolmogorov (1903 Kolmogorov ( -1987 in 1932 [32] . Actually, Heyting and Kolmogorov regarded their respective formulations as distinct. To convey the idea, let us consider the explanations of ∨ (disjunction, "or"), → (implication, "implies") and ¬ (negation, "not") in Heyting's formulation:
• A proof of A ∨ B is given by exhibiting either a proof of A or a proof of B.
• A proof of A → B is a construction f transforming any proof d of A into a proof f(d) of B.
• A proof of ¬A is a construction which transforms any possible proof of A into a contradiction, e.g. 0 = 1.
One can take the notion of a falsehood or contradiction (⊥) as primitive; then ¬A is the same as A → ⊥. A falsehood is simply a statement which cannot have a proof. These explanations are actually rather vague, since they make use of unexplained primitive notions 2 such as "(constructive) proof " and "construction". However, notwithstanding the vagueness, the explanations serve to justify the usual laws of intuitionistic logic, such as A ∨ B → B ∨ A and A → (B → A), while at the same time making it clear why, for example, the principle of the excluded middle is not intuitionistically acceptable.
In Kolmogorov's interpretation, intuitionistic logic is seen as a calculus of problems; each proposition represents a problem. For example,
• Problem A ∨ B is solved by solving either A or B.
• A → B is solved if one can reduce the solution of problem B to the solution of problem A.
• ¬A is solved if one can show there is no solution of problem A.
Kolmogorov thought that his interpretation, in contrast to Heyting's explanations, also made sense classically. It should be noted, however, that with the concept of a (mathematical) problem Kolmogorov introduced a notion not present in standard classical logic (even if, on an informal level, mathematics abounds with problems). So one might say that Kolmogorov interprets intuitionistic logic as an extension of classical logic, namely logic enriched with the notion of "solving a problem".
There is a parallel here with a contribution of G odel from 1933, where he describes an interpretation of intuitionistic logic into classical logic enriched with an extra propositional operator Bew, with intuitive meaning "A is provable" for "Bew(A)". As G odel is careful to point out, "provable" should be taken to mean here "provable by any correct means", not "provable in a ÿxed formal system"; for the latter notion, some of the principles postulated by G odel for Bew are incorrect, as follows from G odel's incompleteness theorems. If one reads (necessity) for Bew, G odel's principles for Bew yield a well-known and elegant axiomatization of the modal logic S4. G odel mentions indeed Kolmogorov's paper in a footnote, but presumably his work is inspired by Heyting's explanations of the intuitionistic logical operators.
Returning to Kolmogorov's own formulation, one may observe that a problem is usually expressed by a mathematical statement, and "solving the problem A" then corresponds to "proving A". This led Heyting to the conclusion, many years later, that Kolmogorov's interpretation and his own were basically the same [24] .
Realizability
The vagueness of the basic notions of "constructive proof " and "construction" prevents immediate technical applications of the proof interpretation. For such applications we need to ÿnd a more concrete, perhaps unintended, "model" for these notions. Such a model need not be faithful to the informal interpretation, provided that it embodies some essential constructive principles.
A beautiful example of such a concrete version of the proof interpretation is Kleene's interpretation of statements of number theory, ÿrst published in 1945, but conceived in 1941.
The key idea is, that the mathematically interesting information contained in a constructive proof of a statement A is the information telling us how existential statements and disjunctions occurring in A are to be realized.
Kleene deÿnes a notion n r A ("n realizes A"), where A is an arithmetical formula, n a natural number. The intuition behind this notion is "n hereditarily encodes the information about the realization of existential quantiÿers and disjunctions in A".
In the version of arithmetic we have in mind, the formulas are constructed from term equations t = s using logical operators ∨; ∧; →; ¬, ∀; ∃. We write n • m for "the algorithm with code n is applied to argument m", and (n) 0 , (n) 1 are the decodings of n when n is viewed as the code of a pair of natural numbers. Let us look at some clauses.
• n r (t = s) holds if and only if t = s is true.
• n r (A ∨ B) holds if either (n) 0 = 0 and (n) 1 r A or (n) 0 = 0 and (n) 1 r B.
• n r ∃xA(x) if (n) 1 r A((n) 0 ).
• n r (A → B) if, whenever m r A, then n • m is deÿned and n • m realizes B.
This may be seen as a (fairly crude) modeling of the proof interpretation, where the notion of constructive proof is stripped down to "explicit information coded by a number concerning the realization of disjunctions and existential quantiÿers". The construction in the proof interpretation of an implication is in this model interpreted as a (partial) algorithm, or a partial recursive function. Proofs of term equations t = s contain no interesting information about realizing ∨ or ∃, hence it is irrelevant which numbers we take to realize t = s, once one knows that t = s holds.
It looks at ÿrst sight as if Kleene's notion of realizability is straightaway inspired by the proof interpretation. However, the historical development is not quite that straightforward. According to Kleene's own remarks in a retrospective paper from 1971 [31] , he derived his initial inspiration from the ÿnitistic reading of disjunctions and existential statements as "incomplete communications", explained in considerable detail in the standard work by Hilbert and Bernays (actually written by Bernays), "Grundlagen der Mathematik" the ÿrst volume of which had appeared in 1934.
To explain the situation, this requires a digression. In the ÿrst quarter of this century, Hilbert formulated with increasing precision his programme of saving classical mathematics from the paradoxes by codifying existing mathematical practice in a formal system, which then might be regarded as a combinatorial structure, and for which one could hope to prove the consistency (the impossibility of deriving something like 0 = 1) by elementary combinatorial ("ÿnitistic") means. The body of ÿnitistic mathematics is assumed to be justiÿed by its intuitive evidence and non-controversial nature. Brouwer claimed that this approach had been inspired by the distinction between language and metalanguage made in his thesis, and indeed I believe that Hilbert's programme is for some of its ideas indebted to Brouwer, although this has never been acknowledged in publications of the Hilbert school. (Needless to say, Hilbert's aims were completely di erent from those of Brouwer.) Initially, it was believed that ÿnitistic mathematics more or less coincided with intuitionistic mathematics. However, as pointed out by Bernays in writing [4] this was not correct: ÿnitistic mathematics is more restrictive, not permitting general abstract notions such as "arbitrary number theoretic function". Hence, also the proof interpretation as presented above is not immediately meaningful from a ÿnitistic point of view.
Instead, as explained by Bernays in the ÿrst volume of [26] , one could explain certain logical operators in statements as "incomplete communications" which had to be completed to obtain their ÿnitistic meaning, for example:
• Completing the assertion A ∨ B means to assert either A or B.
• Completing the assertion ∃xA(x) is done by providing some d in the range of x such that A(d). In my second trial, a few weeks later, of a deÿnition of realizability, I thought of an implication "A → B" in terms of an e ective process for converting information a to complete "A" into information b to complete "B". This idea "worked" when I took into account that the e ective process need only lead to a number b when applied to a number a which does complete "A".
What is remarkable in this quotation is that Kleene did not view his clause for implication as an analogue of Heyting's clause for implication.
Nevertheless, from our present-day perspective, it seems obvious that realizability may be seen as a model of the proof interpretation, where the collection of proofs of a statement is modeled by a collection of realizing numbers of the statement; and one may think of realizing numbers as "skeletons" of proofs, in which only information concerning the disjunctions and the existential statements has been retained.
Many variants of realizability have been devised; one of these, q -realizability, 3 enables us to extract from a constructive proof in, say, intuitionistic ÿrst-order arithmetic of ∀y∃x A(y; x) an algorithm, given by a code number m, say, such that in intuitionistic ÿrst-order arithmetic ∀y A(y; m•y):
This may be used for a proofs-as-programs method, according to which algorithms are found by giving a constructive proof of a statement that is the speciÿcation of a problem.
An interesting aspect of Kleene's realizability is that it gives a classical interpretation to formalisms based on intuitionistic logic plus additional principles which are in formal contradiction with classical logic. For example, to ÿrst-order arithmetic based on intuitionistic logic one may consistently add the "intuitionistic form of Church's thesis":
For arbitrary arithmetical A, if ∀n∃mA(n; m) (n; m natural numbers), then there is an algorithm f such that ∀nA(n; f(n)).
This principle is easily seen to be incompatible with classical logic. Another interesting principle appears when we consider the extension to second-order arithmetic, i.e. a formalism where we can quantify over sets of natural numbers. Writing (t; s) for the number coding of the pair t; s, each set Y may also be regarded as coding a set of pairs (a binary relation). Extra clauses for realizability include:
• n r X (t) if X * (n; t), where X * is assumed to be a set variable assigned 1-1 in a ÿxed manner to the set variable X . (To a variable set X we assign a variable set of pairs X * , so that we may read X * (t; s) as "t realizes Xs".)
. More informally, a number n realizes a property A(X ) for all sets X if for all sets of pairs X * (representing arbitrary realization predicates) n realizes A(X ).
A remarkable consequence of this deÿnition is that the following highly non-classical uniformity principle is realized:
Intuitively, this principle says "if for each X there exists a number n such that A(X; n) holds, then there is a single number n such that for all X we have A(X; n)". Classically, this is obviously false: take A(X; n) to be the property "n = 0 and X is empty, otherwise n = 1 and X is not empty". One may convince oneself of the plausibility of this principle from an intuitionistic point of view as follows.
Arbitrary sets of natural numbers are very "hazy", indeÿnite objects; there is not a single element for which we can with certainty determine whether it belongs to the set or not. (Think of the set which contains all natural numbers if the Riemann hypothesis is true, otherwise it is empty. Intuitionistically, being element of this set is a well deÿned mathematical property, but here is not a single number (at present) for which we can guarantee that it belongs to the set, or for which we know for certain that it does not belong to the set. So if we can ÿnd a natural number n for each set X such that A(X; n), the only way we can imagine for assigning always such a very deÿnite object as a natural number to something as indeÿnite as the arbitrary set, is in a trivial way: assign the same number to all sets.
The deÿnition of realizability for second-order arithmetic ÿrst appears in 1970 in [35] , and the uniformity principle is explicitly formulated in [51] .
Higher-order arithmetic is a strengthening of second-order arithmetic, where we can quantify not only over numbers and sets of numbers, but also over sets of sets of numbers, over sets of sets of sets of numbers, etc. Realizability for second-order arithmetic is a ÿrst step towards realizability for higher-order arithmetic; and realizability for higher-order arithmetic has led towards algorithmic models of the polymorphic lambda calculus; we shall return to this later.
Another possible use one can make of realizability is in ÿnding, in a systematic way, constructive equivalents to classical deÿnitions.
Perhaps, it is illustrative to give also an example of an aspect of the proof interpretation which has generated technical work and foundational discussion, without any decisive results. In other words, so far this has turned out to be a dead end.
Kreisel in 1960 [33, 34] proposed to reÿne the proof interpretation in the following way:
• the relation "p proves A" ought to be decidable; • a proof of an implication A → B should consist of a pair (p; f), where f is a construction transforming proofs of A into proofs of B, and p is an argument showing that f has this property.
One reason for this sharpening is that one wants to explain "p proves A" for compound A in terms of notions which are conceptually essentially simpler. Hence, the insistence on decidable proof predicates; then one may require that the p in the clause for implication above is a proof of an especially simple kind, not itself involving proofs of implications or universally quantiÿed statements, but rather something like the veriÿcation of a term equation with free variables by a straightforward computation.
The work of Gentzen
Before I come to the history of the "formulas-as-types" idea, I should say a few words about the work of the German logician Gerhard Gentzen (1909 Gentzen ( -1945 , which constitutes a link between the proof interpretation and formulas-as-types. In 1935 Gentzen's paper "Untersuchungen uber das logische Schliessen" was published. The paper has had, and still has, an enormous impact, especially in proof theory, but also in subjects such as theorem-proving. Gentzen's motivation derived from the problems in the foundations of mathematics. In his paper he compared three styles of formalizing ÿrst-order (intuitionistic and classical) logic: Hilbert-style (as used in formulations of Hilbert's programme, and in the in uential book [25] ), natural deduction, and what we now often call "Gentzen systems". Gentzen was not the ÿrst to formulate natural deduction, but he did it for the full language containing all the usual logical operators ∨; ∧; →; ¬; ∀; ∃, and also for intuitionistic logic, in a convenient presentation. The Gentzen systems were new; the reason for introducing them was that they were technically more manageable than the other two.
In each of these formalizations, we may think of the formal proofs as trees, with the conclusion at the bottom (the root of the tree), and the axioms (in the case of Hilbert-style and Gentzen systems) or assumptions (in the case of natural deduction) at the top nodes (the leaves of the tree). The transition from premises, A; B say, to conclusion C is marked by a horizontal line, so A B C I shall not discuss the Gentzen systems here, since they are not directly relevant to our story. The natural deduction rules for implication logic will be exhibited later. The format of Hilbert-type systems is axiom schemata plus deduction rules; there are no open assumptions which may be discharged, as in natural deduction. For example, intuitionistic implication logic may be axiomatized by the following two schemata:
(that is to say, for all formulas A; B; C these are axioms), and a single rule, modus ponens, If A → B and A; then B:
Gentzen proved the equivalence (w.r.t. the set of derivable formulas) between the three formalizations; moreover, for the Gentzen systems he established a very important property ("Hauptsatz"): any proof of a statement of predicate logic could be transformed into a "direct proof", a proof without detours so to speak, of the same statement. In direct proofs only subformulas of the conclusion appeared, there were no detours via more complex statements. This property was proved by showing that the so-called Cut rule could always be eliminated from a proof, hence Gentzen's Hauptsatz is also known as "Cut elimination". The corresponding process of eliminating detours for natural deduction is usually called normalization, and this was proved in a direct way by D. Prawitz in 1965. Gentzen analyzed the natural deduction rules as follows.
The introductions represent, as it were, the 'deÿnitions' of the symbols concerned, and the eliminations are no more, in the ÿnal analysis, than the consequences of these deÿnitions.
Gentzen's idea may be readily understood by reference to the proof interpretation, and it may safely be assumed that Gentzen was aware of this, since he clearly showed to have grasped the essentials of the ongoing foundational debate. Applied to the rules for implication, this yields [A] . . .
B A → B
If we have a way of getting from assumption A to conclusion B, we have, in fact, established A → B (without assumption A). [A] indicates zero or more occurrences of an open hypothesis of the form A. A → B A B If we have A → B, this means that we have a method for getting from A to B; and we have an argument for A; hence B. So this rule may be said to be justiÿed by the fact that the introduction rule for → tells us that an implication is given by 'a method for getting from A to B'.
Formulas-as-types
The expression "formulas-as-types" is widely used, but its precise meaning is not sharply delimited, since various authors di er in their interpretation. It seems to me that one may distinguish at least three aspects (or if you like, "variants") of the notion, as follows. More detailed explanations will follow afterwards. Summing up, one may distinguish the following aspects in the formulas-as-types idea (unexplained terms will be explained later on). (A) Noting the existence of a parallel between "proof of a formula" and "element of a type (set)", and beyond this the observation that the implicational formulas provable in intuitionistic implication logic correspond exactly to the inhabited types in the basic theory of type assignment. (B) A strengthening of the preceding: the isomorphism between simple type theory and natural deduction for minimal (= intuitionistic) implication logic, with ÿ-reduction corresponding to normalization on the deduction side. This isomorphism may be extended to full predicate logic by a suitable extension of simple type theory. (C) The exploitation of the similarities between "proof of a formula" and "element of a type" by giving a uniform presentation of rules for proving propositions and elementhood of types. These three aspects of "formulas-as-types" may be distinguished by the abbreviations FAT(A), FAT(B) and FAT(C), respectively. Before discussing the history of this idea, I shall ÿrst try to explain formulas-as-types, version (B), more particularly for intuitionistic implication logic on the one hand, and simple type theory on the other.
The key idea is the following: intuitionistically, propositions are determined by the set of their proofs. We may say that a proof p belongs to a proposition A if p is a proof of A. Hence, propositions and the proofs establishing them correspond to sets with their elements.
The analogy does not stop here: the operation of forming the set A → B of functions from A to B corresponds to the formation of an implication A → B with its proofs being constructions mapping the proofs from A to proofs of B. In a similar way (going for a moment beyond implication logic), the formation of a cartesian product A × B corresponds to the set of proofs of a conjunction A ∧ B, which are pairs of proofs of A and B, respectively.
However, the sets in this analogy do not correspond so much to sets as we know them from axiomatic set theory, but to the types (which may be regarded as special sets) in the simple theory of types. In the simple theory of types we have a collection of unspeciÿed basic types (denoted by type variables) and some operations for constructing new types from given ones; in particular, the function-type constructor will always be present. The rules of simple type theory tell us what the objects are which belong to a given type.
In the formalism of simple type theory ( → for short) we have type terms (expressions denoting types) and individual terms, expressions denoting elements of types. Each individual term has a ÿxed type, and all the subterms of an individual term have a ÿxed type as well. So individual terms in → always appear as t: A, where A is a type expression. This is called rigid typing. Simple type theory was ÿrst formulated by Church in 1940.
For function types, the canonical method for constructing an element is by abstraction: let t[x: A]: B be a term describing the construction of an element of type B from an arbitrary element x of type A, then x:t[x: A]: A→B is the term t as function of x, an element of type A → B. Since all elements of A → B are assumed to be functions, we of course also have application:
4 t: A→B applied to s: A yields a term (t: A→B)(s: A): B.
→ has standard set-theoretic models; in these models, the types are interpreted by sets, and terms t: A by elements of the set interpreting A.
If we write [ ] ]] for the interpretation function, and for the environment interpreting the individual and type variables, then [ ]A → B]] is the set of all set-theoretic functions from [ ]A]] to [ ]B]] , etc.
The rules for constructing terms in the simple type theory clearly correspond to the natural deduction rules for introducing an implication and eliminating an implication. Therefore, the following rule may be read either as a schematic rule of implication introduction, where the terms appearing at each node of the proof tree are nothing but a linear notation for the proof obtained hitherto, or as a schematic representation of the rule of term formation for function types:
. . . It means that we can replace a tree as on the left by the tree on the right, thereby removing a detour:
The isomorphism as explained above covers only implication logic. But there is no di culty in extending it to full predicate logic, by extending → with new type constructors, one constructor for each new logical operation, and new term-formation rules, one rule for each natural deduction rule.
H.B. Curry
The ÿrst clear expression of the formulas-as-types idea in the version FAT(A) was formulated by Curry in 1958 [15] , with a hint of it in 1942 [13] . Curry considered a calculus for assigning types to untyped lambda-terms. 5 The untyped terms are in a sense pure algorithms, without speciÿed domain and range; or to put it otherwise, the lambda-calculus deals with a universe where everything can be both operation and argument. But if we specify a subdomain for an argument, what can we say about the range of an operator?
Curry ÿrst considered a system of type assignment corresponding on the logical side to a Hilbert-type axiomatization of intuitionistic implication logic. That is to say, he had two axioms assigning types to the constants K and S: There is an important di erence however. Here the types are not considered to be part of the lambda terms, and the subterms of the lambda terms have no types attached to them.
So Curry knew how to exploit the formulas-as-types parallel for his theories of type assignment. In particular, he uses the idea of Cut elimination, taken from Gentzen's work. One might also say that Curry proves indirectly, via the correspondence between natural deduction and Gentzen systems, a normalization theorem for natural deduction for implication logic; as far as I know, this is the ÿrst published proof (Turing had a proof of normalization for simple type theory as early as 1942, but this was only published by Gandy in 1980). However, Curry does not formulate the result as a result on intuitionistic implication logic. For Curry, it is a normal form theorem for typable lambda terms.
It should be pointed out that formulas-as-types has much more impact, and more interesting consequences, when formulated for natural deduction, than when it is formulated for Hilbert-type axiomatizations only. 6 A few years after [15] appeared, Curry published a standard textbook [14] , which contains a detailed treatment of natural deduction and Gentzen calculi, both for intuitionistic and classical logic. It is a remarkable fact, that in this book Curry does not discuss the formulas-as-types parallel. 7 Why did Curry not make use of the formulas-as-types parallel in his study of deduction? I can only guess. One possible reason is a technical one. As we have explained above, the parallel becomes an isomorphism, if one compares natural deductions on the one hand, with simple type theory (with rigid typing) on the other hand. But Curry was interested not in simple type theory, but in type-assignment systems, and then the parallel is not as simple and clear-cut, and more di cult to formulate precisely. Another, perhaps more important reason may be the following: on the deduction side, "formulas-as-types" did not answer any questions Curry was interested in. Summarizing, the insights FAT(A) are present in Curry's work, but not FAT(B).
D. Prawitz
In 1965, Prawitz in a sense "rehabilitated" natural deduction. Gentzen considered natural deduction as the most basic type of formalization, since its rules correspond rather closely to steps in informal reasoning; but for technical work, more precisely, for obtaining metatheorems, he found the Gentzen systems LJ and LK more manageable. Literally, Gentzen says In order to be able to enunciate and prove the Hauptsatz, I had to provide a logical calculus especially suited to the purpose. For this the natural calculus proved unsuitable. For, although it already contains the properties essential to the validity of the Hauptsatz, it does so only with respect to its intuitionist form, in view of the fact that the law of the excluded middle, as pointed out earlier, occupies a special position in relation to these properties. 8 Prawitz' starting point was the formulation where open hypotheses are always discharged as early as possible, but he also described a version with "assumption classes" which may be said to be isomorphic to simple type theory. (He needed such a version for his treatment of the modal logic S4.) On the other hand, there is no mention of Curry's work in [15] . Prawitz showed that natural deductions could be normalized; in a normal proof, a logical constant which has just been introduced is never eliminated at the next rule. Thus, normal proofs also have a claim to be called "direct": in this case too, detours via more complex formulas do not occur, all formulas involved are subformulas of the conclusion.
W.A. Howard
The ÿrst explicit formulation of "formulas-as-types" in the form FAT(B) is found in a paper by Howard [27] which widely circulated since 1969, but which appeared in print only in 1980. Howard's aim was foundational: he wanted to develop a notion of construction suitable for the interpretation of intuitionistic mathematics. 9 Howard not only discusses formulas-as-types for propositional logic, but also for intuitionistic arithmetic. By FAT(B), normalization in → is the same as in natural deduction. 10 
N.G. de Bruijn
There is an independent discovery of the formulas-as-types idea in the form FAT(C) towards the end of the sixties, by de Bruijn [8] . De Bruijn and his group developed a language AUTOMATH, designed for the mechanical checking of mathematical proofs. De Bruijn's only clue was the intuitionistic interpretation of implication, as formulated by Heyting for his proof interpretation. For a long time the results on AUTOMATH were not very accessible, since a lot of it could be found in internal reports and Ph.D. theses only; but recently all the interesting material on AUTOMATH was brought together in one volume [42] .
H. L auchli
Independently also, L auchli [36] used in 1968 the ideas of formulas-as-types for obtaining a completeness proof for intuitionistic predicate logic, relative to a notion which might be regarded as a version of realizability.
Martin-L of 's type theories
Formulas-as-types in the form FAT(B) and FAT(C) was the guiding idea behind the construction of an intuitionistic type theory by Martin-L of. This type theory appeared in several versions. The ÿrst (inconsistent, impredicative) version dates from 1971, but the ÿrst published (consistent and predicative) version appeared in 1975. Martin-L of 's original aim was to give a foundation for constructive mathematics, but in 1979 [40] he proposed a version of his type theory as a language for programming. The formulasas-types idea in these theories results in bringing together, for example, induction over the natural numbers and deÿnition of arithmetical functions by recursion, as instances of the same set of rules for the type of the natural numbers. (The same idea applies also to other data types.) 9 Correspondence between Kreisel and Howard suggests that it was Martin-L of who pointed out that the most pregnant expression of formulas-as-types, FAT(B), is obtained when the logic is based on natural deduction. (I owe this information to H.R. Jervell.) Cf. also the footnote in [27] added by Howard in 1979. Apparently critical remarks by Kreisel concerning the usefulness of formulas-as-types w.r.t. the intended aim made Howard refrain from publishing his note. 10 Howard states that he owes this insight to Tait, and refers to the paper [49] .
There is a strong avour of realizability in the Martin-L of type systems; one may very well think of these systems as incorporating an abstract version of Kleene's realizability.
Thus, if t: (∃x: A)B(x), t must be a pair (t 0 ; t 1 ) such that t 1 : B(t 0 ) and t 0 : A. It is this feature which makes it possible to use Martin-L of 's theories for proofs-as-programs (or proofs-as-algorithms); if (∃x: A)B(x) is a proposition describing a speciÿcation, a proof of (∃x: A)B(x) in a Martin-L of type system appears as a deduction with conclusion t: (∃x: A)B(x) and from t we can extract the second component t 0 for the required x. See also the next section.
From constructivism to computer science
In this ÿnal section I shall brie y describe two applications of the ideas discussed above, a theoretical one and a more practical one.
The polymorphic lambda calculus
The polymorphic lambda calculus, usually designed by 2 or as "system F" was ÿrst discovered by Girard in 1972 [19] , and rediscovered some years later by Reynolds [46] . 2 is a powerful extension 11 of → . The simplest way of describing it is to say, relying on FAT(B), that it is isomorphic to a natural deduction formulation of intuitionistic second-order propositional logic with implication and universal quantiÿers over propositions. The rules for implication are as before, but the rules for the quantiÿers are (P; Q propositional variables)
On the left, A has been derived with open assumptions not containing P free; on the right, [Q=B] denotes substitution of formula B for the propositional variable Q. In terms of types, this means that we have an abstraction operator over type variables corresponding to the rule of ∀-introduction, and an application of terms to types corresponding to the ∀-elimination. For example, ( x: A)(x: A) is the identity function for type A, and t ≡ P:( x: P)(x: P)
is the universal identity function, which specializes, when applied to type A, to tA = ( x: A)(x: A). Generally, ( P:t)A = t[P=A]. If we want to extend the set-theoretic models of → to 2, we have to pick a domain for the range of the propositional variables, and then the objects of type ∀P A[P] are to be all functions assigning to each P in the propositional domain an object in type A[P].
Reynolds showed in 1984 [47] that such a set-theoretic model for 2 could not exist. However, Reynolds argument made essential use of classical logic. If we move to an alternative universe, with intuitionistic logic, there are other possibilities. One such solution is described in the paper by Pitts [44] ( [45] is also illuminating in this respect), where it is shown that in the e ective topos E we can construct a model for 2 based on a set-theoretic interpretation, in an intuitionistic universe. A topos may be seen as a category with extra structure, such that it is possible to interpret intuitionistic higherorder logic in it; one might say that toposes are just category-theoretic equivalents of models for intuitionistic higher-order logic. E is a topos which might be described as the category-theoretic version of Kleene realizability extended to intuitionistic higherorder logic; it was introduced by Hyland in 1980 [28] . For the construction of a model of 2 in E it is crucial that a generalization of the Uniformity Principle (mentioned in the section on realizability) holds.
Longo and Moggi [37] use another category (!-set) for a model of polymorphism, also making use of the Uniformity Principle. For Hylands construction, see [29] .
There are more nice examples of the fruitfulness of formulas-as-types in theory; for example, in the work of Barendregt, Coppo and Dezani [1] where intersection types are added to a standard type-assignment system, the theory of (slightly extended) natural deduction proofs is used to prove conservativeness of the extended system over the original system, that is to say the extension does not prove new statements in the old language.
Formulas-as-types, programming, and proofs-as-algorithms
The formulas-as-types idea in the version FAT(C) has served as a source of inspiration in the construction of several languages designed with the proofs-as-algorithms paradigm in mind. A survey may be found in [42, pp. 8-12] .
For example, there is the "calculus of constructions" by Coquand and Huet, combining ideas from Girard's 2 and AUTOMATH [11, 12] . Luo [38] designed the "extended calculus of constructions". For these languages implementations have been designed, such as LEGO and Coq, which can be used for interactive proof construction.
Close to AUTOMATH is LF ("Logical Framework") developed in Edinburgh [21] ; this system has also been implemented.
As mentioned above, Martin-L of proposed a version of his type theory as a functional programming language, embodying the programs-from-proofs paradigma. In [43] this is elaborated in detail.
In practice, one has to compromise with the purity of the original idea of completely amalgamating propositions and types: it is not always useful to insist on "types = propositions". For example, if one considers a subset of a given type A, one is not always interested in the information which provides the proof that a given element of A belongs to the subset, but only in the truth of this statement. Thus, one has to relax the rigid schema of introduction and elimination rules, in exchange for a more convenient manipulation of subsets. Similarly, in AUTOMATH, where one is using classical logic, one is not interested in the details of a proof of some proposition, so one introduces a principle of "irrelevance of proof ", in fact a coarse equivalence relation on the proofs of propositions, which tells us that any two proofs of a proposition are to be regarded as equivalent (cf. Zucker's paper [52] ). But for this principle one has to distinguish between types and propositions. So the formulas-as-types parallel is then relaxed; what remains from this idea is the general scheme for declaring what elements of a type (proposition are), with elimination rules as a counterpart to the introduction rules.
This illustrates that ideas taken from theory are not used as such, but in applications nearly always have to be adapted and modiÿed to the purpose at hand.
There is also a system for interactive proof-construction based on Martin-L of 's ideas, namely Nuprl [10] .
However, in order to use proofs as programs (algorithms) we do not have to go all the way to a constructive type theory. Simpler formalisms such as simple type theory, combined with a suitable variant of realizability (cf. our earlier remarks on q-realizability in Section 2) may do the job as well.
A nice example of this possibility was recently discovered by Berger (cf. [3] ). The example concerns a special case of Higman's lemma, namely the following statement Let a n n , b n n be two (inÿnite) sequences of natural numbers. Then there are i; j with i ¡ j such that a i 6a j and b i 6b j .
This statement is easily proved classically. Let i 0 = min{k : a k = min{a i : i ∈ IN}}; i p+1 = min{k ¿ i p : a k = min{a i : i ¿ i p }}:
Then a i0 6a i1 6a i2 6 : : :; now pick for j the least k such that b i k 6b i k+1 , then i j ; i j+1 , is a pair as in the statement. This proof is classical, but may be transformed into a constructive proof by a variant of a translation devised by H.M. Friedman, and to the resulting proof one then applies the so-called modiÿed realizability (cf. [2] ) in order to extract an algorithm. The variant of Friedman's translation is chosen so as to keep the complexity of formulas down as much as possible, since this results in simpler extracted algorithms when applying the realizability interpretation. For our example the result is the following algorithm, where s ranges over lists of natural numbers, lead(s) is list s without last element, last(s) is the last element of list s, s * i is list s with i appended at the end, is the empty list:
pair(s; i; j) := if b i 6b j then if a i 6a j then (i; j) else if s = then pair( ; j; j + 1)
else pair(lead(s); last(s); j) fi fi else pair(s * i; j; j + 1) fi and the sought for solution is pair ( ; 0; 1) .
This results in a better algorithm than the "brute-force algorithm", which is essentially a systematic search through all pairs (i; j): deÿne br(i; j) := if i ¡ j then if a i 6a j and b i 6b j then (i; j) else br(i + 1; j) fi else br(0; j + 1) fi and take for the solution br(0; 1). The new algorithm is faster; for suitable sequences it shows a quadratic improvement.
The method sketched is sensitive to the choice of axioms in the formalization; extra axioms which are, strictly speaking, redundant (since derivable) may simplify the proof and hence simplify the extracted terms.
